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Abstract 
 
We analyze the performance of retail firms for the period 1978-97 using public financial data. 
Our performance measures are long-term stock returns and whether the firm filed for bankruptcy 
in the period of study. We assume that over a long time period of at least five years, stock returns 
are a reasonable measure of the overall success of a firm. 
We have found a very wide disparity in performance between firms. On the one hand, 
retailers like Wal-Mart, the Gap and Circuit City have had phenomenal success (nineteen year 
compounded stock returns of 31.2%, 29.5%, and 34.5%, respectively), while on the other, 17% 
of the public retail firms filed for bankruptcy. We investigate how the following levers managed 
by the CEO of a retail firm affect performance: return on assets, sales growth, inventory turns, 
gross margin, financial leverage, and selling, general, and administrative expenses. The nature of 
the analysis is contemporaneous, providing insights into managerial actions that correlate with 
success as measured by stock returns, but not a prediction of future stock returns.  
We find that (1) return on assets, sales growth, standard deviation of return on assets and 
financial leverage explain more than 50% of the variation in stock returns for periods of ten years 
or more; (2) retailers in different segments–apparel, department stores, grocery and convenience 
stores, drugs and pharmaceuticals, jewelry, consumer electronics, home furnishings, toys, and 
variety stores–achieve similar return on assets and return on equity by following very different 
strategies with respect to their gross margins and inventory turns; (3) even within the same 
segment, high gross margin correlates with low inventory turns, and with high selling, general, 
and administrative expenses; (4) risk of bankruptcy is related to the mismatch between how fast 
a firm attempts to grow versus what growth rate it realizes. We also test for a negative 
correlation between sales growth and return on assets, which is widely believed to be true but is 
not borne out by our data. 
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1. Introduction 
We analyze the performance of retail firms for the period 1978-97 using public financial data. 
Our performance measures are long-term stock returns and whether the firm filed for bankruptcy 
in the period of study. We assume that over a long time period of at least five years, stock returns 
are a reasonable measure of the overall success of a firm; the nature of the analysis is 
contemporaneous, providing insights into managerial actions that correlate with success as 
measured by stock returns, but not a prediction of future stock returns. We investigate how the 
following levers managed by the CEO affect success: return on assets, sales growth, inventory 
turns, gross margin, financial leverage, and selling, general, and administrative expenses. 
Figure 1a shows a histogram of the compounded annualized stock returns of 293 public-
listed retailers from December 1978 to December 1997 (nineteen years). Our data are drawn 
from Compustat and CRSP databases.1 Notice that there is a very wide disparity in the stock 
returns of companies. There are tremendous successes like Wal-Mart, Gap Inc., and Circuit City 
Stores Inc. and dismal failures as evinced by the high rate of bankruptcy. If you had invested 
$1,000 in Wal-Mart stock at the close of trading on December 31, 1978, it would have grown to 
$173,000 by the end of December 31, 1997. A similar amount invested in Gap would have 
grown to $136,000, and in Circuit City, to $278,000. On the other hand, if you invested equally 
in all public retail firms in December 1978, about 17% of the firms you invested in would have 
filed for bankruptcy before December 1997. 
Figure 1b shows the histogram of average stock returns of firms in the S&P 500 index on 
December 31, 1978 over the period 1978 to 1997. Comparing this with figure 1a, we observe 
that retail firms have a much higher variation in their overall success than the S&P 500 firms. 
Retailing is, thus, an excellent “laboratory” to measure the values of various managerial 
strategies. Our methodology and many of the results can be applied to other industries like 
distribution and manufacturing. However, the insights obtained may be limited if accounting 
statements do not adequately capture the key performance variables in some industry. Examples 
                                                                 
1 Our data set contains 346 firms, of which, we included all those firms that had stock return data for at least two 
years in this analysis. All returns were adjusted for dividends and stock-splits. For firms that had been publicly 
traded for less than nineteen years, we computed the returns based on the data available. For example, for a firm that 
had been public from 1985 to 1994, we computed returns over this period only. 
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include labor productivity in automobile manufacturing and intellectual assets in software 
development. 
The wide disparity in retail performance begets several questions. We motivate them with 
an example of four contrasting companies in consumer electronics retailing. Figure 2 shows the 
annual sales, return on assets, inventory turns, gross margin and stock price appreciation for Best 
Buy Inc., Circuit City Stores Inc., Good Guys Inc., and Tandy Corporation.2 The graphs show 
systematic differences between the retailers. Best Buy consistently achieved the highest sales 
growth, the lowest return on assets, and the lowest gross margin. Tandy consistently had the 
highest gross margin and the lowest inventory turns. Good Guys was comparable in sales volume 
to Best Buy in 1978 but achieved lower sales growth, higher return on assets, and the highest 
inventory turns in almost every period. Circuit City had the most consistent performance on all 
dimensions and the second highest return on assets. Given that each retailer was dominant on 
some measure of performance, it is not obvious from these comparisons which firm was more 
successful or how much impact sales growth and return on assets had on overall success. By 
analyzing these and other questions in this paper, we demonstrate the usefulness of the 
information contained in public financial data and provide insights into managerial actions that 
correlate with success as measured by stock returns. 
Our main findings are as follows: 
1. Firms with high average return on assets, high sales growth, and low standard deviation 
of return on assets achieved higher long-term stock returns. 
2. The values of return on assets, sales growth, and return on equity do not vary 
significantly from one retail segment to another (e.g., apparel, grocery, department stores, 
etc.) implying that no one segment has yielded consistently higher returns over the period 
1978 to 1997. 
3. However, the components of return on assets vary considerably between retail segments. 
As expected, grocery firms have high inventory turns and low gross margins, while 
jewelry firms have high gross margins and low inventory turns. Given (2) above, it is not 
surprising that these differences are mostly of a compensating nature. 
                                                                 
2 Tandy Corporation owns the Radio Shack chain of stores. 
 3
4. The components of return on assets exhibit systematic tradeoffs even within the same 
segment. Firms with high gross margin have low inventory turns. Firms with high gross 
margin also spend more on selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA). 
However, contrary to our expectations, firms with high return on assets have high sales 
growth rates, though the extent of association is stronger for long time periods than for 
one or two year periods. 
5. Firms that filed for bankruptcy had a much wider gap between their targeted growth rates 
and realized growth rates in the years before bankruptcy than the other firms. As a result, 
their asset productivity declined faster than that of healthy firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a review of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 provides definitions of the performance levers obtained from public financial data and 
describes hypotheses for the following: for measuring the association between the management 
levers and firm success in section 3.1; for studying the relationships between gross margin and 
inventory turns, gross margin and SG&A expenses, and return on assets and sales growth in 
section 3.2; and for constructing a relationship between risk of bankruptcy and sales growth rate 
in section 3.3. Section 4 describes the data used in the study. Lastly, sections 5 and 6 present our 
results and discuss their interpretation. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Operations Management and Historical Perspective 
The significance of high inventory turns was recognized by retail firms as early as in 1870s. The 
watchword in Marshall Field’s department store at that time used to be that “any surplus in 
Field’s is not stock, it is cash.3” Even today, retailers fix guide rules on “acceptable” gross 
margin, sell-through percentage, promotional expenses, new store openings, etc. based on similar 
watchwords. There is little, if any, research to explain how much impact superior management of 
these variables has on the overall success¾achieving high stock returns with a low risk of going 
bankrupt. 
                                                                 
3 “Nineteenth Century Retailing and the Rise of the Department Store,” Harvard Business School Case No. 9-384-
022, 1983. 
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The growth of a retail firm is conceptualized in a framework called the “wheel of 
retailing.” The wheel represents phases through which some types of retailers pass. A retailer 
penetrates the market on the basis of low price. Over time, it trades up to more expensive 
merchandise, services, locations, etc., thereby, opening a niche for new low-price retailers. The 
wheel of retailing and other theories of retail lifecycle, described by Levy and Weitz (1995), 
have been accepted for a long time and but their implications on retailers’ performance have not 
been tested empirically. 
Levy and Weitz (1995) describe a model, called the strategic profit model, to analyze the 
interrelationships between management levers of a retail firm. The model proposes that different 
firms may achieve similar return on equity by following different paths: the profit path, or the 
turnover path. The profit path is one with high gross margins and low inventory turns, while the 
turnover path has high inventory turns and low gross margins. Using this classification, the 
model provides a framework for the strategic analysis of retail firms. Our paper rigorously tests 
the interrelationships implied by this model and estimates their tradeoff curves, which can then 
be used to compare performance across retailers. 
2.2 Financial accounting: Study of association between stock returns and accounting earnings 
The association between stock prices and accounting earnings has been studied in academic 
literature in two contexts: whether earnings reports provide timely and useful information to the 
stock market, and whether earnings levels correlate with stock returns over long time periods. 
Seminal work in the first context was done by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968a) and a 
considerable wealth of literature in financial accounting has added to that. Key issues in this 
research are how to measure the information content of earnings reports, which is called 
unexpected earnings, and what is the length of time period over which earnings information 
disseminates to investors. Baruch Lev (1989) provides an excellent review of the research in this 
area. Some older reviews can be found in Foster (1984), Lev (1974), and Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986). In all these studies, the correlation between unexpected earnings and stock price 
movement has been found to be very modest, rarely exceeding 10 per cent. 
Research in the second context, investigating correlation between earnings and stock 
returns over long time periods, is relatively recent and methodologically closer to our analysis. 
Easton, Harris and Ohlson (1992) showed that the association between stock returns and total 
earnings scaled by market capitalization increases as the length of time period increases. They 
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obtained R2 values of 15% for 2 year periods, 20-30% for 5 year periods and 63% for a 10 year 
period. 
The management levers used in our study are derived from accounting statements. They 
include sales growth and various components of return on equity: return on assets, financial 
leverage, gross margin, inventory turns, and selling, general, and administrative expenses. Prior 
research in accounting has not addressed the correlation between these variables and long-term 
stock returns to our knowledge. Our methodology and econometric models are similar to those of 
Easton, Harris and Ohlson. 
2.3 Research on bankruptcy 
The other area of research in accounting relevant to this paper pertains to bankruptcy. There are 
many models in literature for the prediction of bankruptcy (also called financial distress or 
corporate failure). The models can be classified as univariate and multivariate. Univariate models 
focus on the selection of the best variable for predicting bankruptcy from the leverage, liquidity 
and profitability ratios obtained from financial statements, and multivariate models combine 
several financial variables into a single discriminant function. Pioneering work in univariate 
models was done by Beaver (1966). He conducted a comparison of mean financial ratios of a 
paired sample of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms for 1 to 5 years before the actual occurrence 
of bankruptcy. This analysis is called profile analysis. Some of the ratios used were cash 
flow/debt, net income/total assets, total debt/total assets, working capital/total assets, etc. Altman 
(1968), in a seminal paper on multivariate models, used multiple discriminant analysis to 
construct a linear function of five financial ratios that best distinguished between bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt firms. Ohlson (1980) used logit analysis to compute the probability of a company 
going bankrupt as a function of its financial ratios. Other predictive models of bankruptcy are 
presented in Beaver (1968b), and in Beaver (1968c). Zmijewski (1983) compares the univariate 
and multivariate models used in the studies before 1983 using a common statistical technique, a 
common definition of bankruptcy, and a common sample. 
Economic theory has played a small role in the development of univariate or multivariate 
distress prediction models. Baruch Lev (1974) notes thus: “Attempts to construct a theory of 
corporate failure, that is, to identify and generalize the major causes of failure, have been meager 
and generally unsatisfactory because of the complexity and diversity of business operations, the 
lack of a well-defined economic theory of the firm under uncertainty, and a surprising reluctance 
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by many researchers to incorporate the failure phenomenon in their models”. Two attempts in 
this respect are by Wilcox (1971 and 1973) and Vinso (1979). Both these papers used gambler’s 
ruin model to represent a firm and computed its probability of going bankrupt. These models 
have not been used in empirical research. Scott (1981) presents a review of theoretical and 
empirical research in bankruptcy with a view to reconciling the results of these two streams. 
Our approach to analyzing bankruptcy differs considerably from existing research. The 
data samples used in all existing research have spanned several industries, which in our view, has 
made it difficult to identify causes of bankruptcy since they may vary from one industry to 
another. We focus on one industry, retailing, and attempt to formulate reasons why retail firms 
go bankrupt based on an understanding of their business operations. We find evidence that the 
risk of bankruptcy of a retail firm is related to the mismatch between how fast it attempts to grow 
and how much of that growth it is able to realize. This result is consistent with the existing 
research since not being able to realize a targeted growth rate can lead to a liquidity crisis in a 
retail company due to declining asset productivity and leftover inventory. We are currently 
testing a predictive model of bankruptcy using growth as the explanatory variable. 
 
3. Models and Hypotheses Formulation 
Appendix 1 contains the notation for all the variables used in this paper. For each variable, the 
subscript t = 0,…,T denotes the year of the financial statement, and i denotes the company. For 
instance, Sit represents the sales during year t and Invit represents the inventory at the end of year 
t. Using these income statement and balance sheet figures, we compute the following 
performance levers: return on assets, return on equity, sales growth, financial leverage, gross 
margin, inventory turns, total asset turns, gross margin return on inventory investment, and 
selling, general and administrative expenses as a fraction of sales. Their mathematical definitions 
used in the paper are shown in appendix 2; the subscript i is omitted for clarity. 
 
3.1 Association between stock returns and management levers 
We estimate the impact of return on assets, standard deviation of return on assets, sales growth, 
gross margin return on inventory investment, and financial leverage on firm success using cross-
sectional regression models as described in this section. Firm success is measured by long-term 
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(five years or more) stock returns. In shorter periods, movements in stock prices may occur due 
to external factors, and may not reflect fundamental changes in the performance of a firm. 
However, over long time periods, we assume that stock markets are efficient and reflect the true 
value of a firm. 
The explanatory variables were identified by studying examples of some retail firms. We 
started with a larger set of levers including gross margin, inventory turns, and selling, general, 
and administrative expenses, besides the variables listed above. We observed that each of these 
levers had limited ability to explain success because firms that performed well on one lever may 
not perform well on the others. For example, in figure 2, Tandy has the highest gross margin but 
the lowest inventory turns. Return on assets and gross margin return on inventory are aggregate 
levers, incorporating the impact of more than one component, and hence, we use these to 
correlate with stock returns. We analyze standard deviation of return on assets also because we 
view it as another lever controlled by the management. Comparing Circuit City and Good Guys 
in figure 2, we observe that they have very similar average return on assets, but Circuit City 
shows a more consistent performance than Good Guys. The interrelationships between different 
components of return on assets are examined in section 3.2. 
The models used for estimation are as follows. These models are tested with data for all 
retail firms that did not file for bankruptcy during the period of study. Each model is estimated 
for different time periods of length 5, 10, 15, and 19 years. For each period, we include all firms 
that have complete data available during that time, and exclude the others. 
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Here, Ri denotes average stock returns over a given time period for firm i, RoAi, the average 
return on assets, gi, the average sales growth rate, DEi, the ratio of long-term debt to equity 
(financial leverage), sRoA, the standard deviation of return on assets, RoEi, the average return on 
equity, DGMRoIIi, the standardized gross margin return on inventory (explained below), GM$i 
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the total gross margin in dollars per share earned by firm i over the entire time period, SGA$i the 
total selling, general and administrative expenses in dollars per share incurred by firm i over the 
entire time period, Invi the sum of annual closing inventory in dollars per share for firm i over 
the entire time period, TAi the sum of annual closing total assets in dollars per share for firm i 
over the entire time period, and Pi0 the share price for firm i at the beginning of the time period. 
Since we intend to compare success across companies, all five models are cross-sectional. That 
is, there is one data point per firm over the period of analysis, and the model fits a least squared 
error equation across firms and not over time for the same firm. Equation (2) uses return on 
equity in place of its components return on assets, financial leverage, and GMRoII in order to 
provide a benchmark for equations (1) and (3) since net earnings and return on equity (ratio of 
net earnings to book value of total assets) have been more commonly studied in academic 
literature than their components. Equations (4) and (5) use dollar amounts as alternative 
management levers instead of ratio measures. All these values are scaled by number of shares 
and share price to correct for size differences. The coefficients of inventory and total assets 
represent the cost of investment as perceived by investors. The index s on the coefficients 
indicates that we estimate different coefficients for each retail segment because inventory turns 
and asset turns vary significantly from one retail segment to another as explained below. 
Standardized GMRoII, DGMRoIIi, is defined as the standardized deviation of GMRoII of 
firm i from its retail segment. Mathematically, 
)s(GMROII
GMROIIGMROII
GMROII
s
s
i
i
-
=D  (6) 
Here, GMRoIIi denotes the average GMRoII for firm i over some time period, GMRoIIs denotes 
the average GMRoII for retail segment s over the same time period and s(GMRoIIs) denotes the 
standard error of GMRoII for segment s. We cannot do a regression of stock returns directly with 
GMRoII because, unlike the variables in equations (1) and (2), GMRoII varies systematically 
from one retail segment to another. Table 1 shows the results of ANOVA tests for the variation 
in the values of performance levers between the following retail segments: apparel, department 
stores, grocery and convenience stores, drugs and pharmaceuticals, jewelry, consumer 
electronics, home furnishings, toys, and variety stores. We observe from the F-statistics that 
RoA, RoE and sales growth do not have significant between-segment variation. For financial 
leverage, while the F-statistic is significant, pair-wise tests for differences between the financial 
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leverage of any two retail segments are not statistically significant. Thus, we think that financial 
leverage also does not vary systematically between segments, and the significance of the F-
statistic comes from the large number of degrees of freedom. The results in this table are not 
unexpected because: 
1. Assuming limited entry- and exit- barriers in each retail segment, return on equity should 
not vary from one segment to another over long time periods. Segments with higher RoE 
would attract competitors until their returns were equalized. Similarly, segments with low 
RoE would see some companies exit the segment, leaving the remaining companies with 
higher RoE. 
2. Financial leverage is entirely under the control of managers. So we do not expect it to 
vary between segments. 
3. Since RoA can be derived from RoE and financial leverage, it too should not vary from 
one segment to another if RoE and financial leverage do not vary. 
4. Lastly, sales growth is also determined by the management of a company. We expect that 
a high growth retail segment would see many new entries so that its growth rate will slow 
down over a long time period, while a low growth retail segment would see more 
consolidation activity boosting its growth rate. Thus we do not expect growth rates to be 
higher for one segment than for another over long time periods. 
GMRoII, however, has very large differences between retail segments. For example, 
grocery chains have average GMRoII of 393% while apparel chains have GMRoII of 240%. To 
understand these differences, we break RoA into its components as follows: 
 RoA = [GM – SGA]/Assets 
  = [GM/Inventory] ´ [Inventory/Assets] ´ [GM – SGA]/GM 
  = GMRoII ´ Inventory Intens ity ´ SGA Intensity (7) 
We find that the differences in the values of the components of RoA between segments are of a 
compensating nature. Grocery retail firms have a higher GMRoII compared to apparel retailers 
but their ‘inventory intensity’ is much lower at 25% compared to apparel retailers, for which it is 
about 33%. Thus, different segments have similar expected return on assets in spite of very 
strong systematic differences between the values of the components of return on assets. The table 
shows average values in each segment for four such variables: total asset turns, inventory turns, 
gross margin, and gross margin return on inventory investment. 
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Stock returns are commonly used by managers, investors and analysts alike to compare 
the performance of firms. However, one concern with using stock returns without risk-
adjustment is that different firms have different risk profiles so that a 20% return achieved by a 
low risk firm may not be comparable to a 20% return achieved by a high risk firm. We control 
for these differences by computing risk-adjusted stock returns and estimating alternative models 
using them as the dependent variable instead of raw stock returns. 
The risk-adjusted stock returns or unexpected stock returns are computed using the 3 
factors model of Fama and French as follows. Let Rit denote the monthly stock return for firm i 
in month t, Rmt denote the value-weighted market return on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, and 
Rft denote the risk-free return obtained on 1-month T-bills. All these values are obtained from 
CRSP time-series records. According to Fama and French (1993), the expected return on a stock 
portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate [E(Rit) - Rft] is explained by the sensitivity of its return to 
three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad market portfolio (Rmt - Rft), (ii) the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks 
(SMBt small minus big), and (iii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-
to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HMLt high minus 
low). Time-series values of SMBt and HMLt have been compiled by Fama and French. Using 
monthly closing stock prices (adjusted for dividends and stock splits) for a retail firm and 
monthly time-series values of the three factors, we estimate the following regression equation. 
 Rit - Rft = ai + b i1 (Rmt - Rft) + b i2 SMBt + b i3 HMLt + e it (8) 
If the firm had no abnormal return, the intercept, ai, in this regression should be zero. The 
unexpected or risk-adjusted return for firm i is defined as the value of the intercept ai obtained 
from the regression. We replace Ri with ai and re-estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) to verify if 
the managerial levers have an impact on this measure of firm success as well. 
To ensure that the results of the models defined above are not influenced by the time 
period over which data were obtained, we estimated the model equations over several time 
periods of different lengths and with different start and end years. If the results of the hypotheses 
are found to be consistent regardless of time period then we shall conclude that our findings are 
not artifacts of the time period analyzed. 
After estimating the model equations, we test the following hypotheses. 
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HYPOTHESIS  1: Firms with higher return on assets, higher sales growth rates, and lower 
standard deviation of return on assets achieved higher long-term stock returns. 
HYPOTHESIS  2: Firms with higher gross margin return on inventory investment relative 
to their retail industry segment achieved higher long-term stock returns. 
HYPOTHESIS  3: Firms with higher return on assets, higher sales growth rates, and lower 
standard deviation of return on assets achieved higher long-term stock returns adjusted for risk. 
 
3.2 Interrelationships between performance levers 
We analyze how firms achieve superior performance on the aggregate managerial levers (return 
on assets, return on equity, sales growth, and gross margin return on inventory investment) by 
studying the following interrelationships across firms: between inventory turns and gross margin, 
between gross margin and SG&A expenses, and between return on assets and sales growth. By 
quantifying these interrelationships, we propose to provide tools for comparing performance 
across firms on these levers, and to characterize the strategies followed by successful firms. 
All firms that filed for bankruptcy are excluded from the analysis in this section. These 
firms may be expected to perform poorly on many performance measures (e.g., low return on 
assets and low sales growth, low gross margin and poor inventory turns, etc.) and may lie below 
the tradeoff curves identified for healthy firms. 
 
Gross Margin and Inventory Turns 
In a competitive market with low entry- and exit-barriers, a retailer that has to carry a unit of 
product longer before being able to sell it (i.e., a retailer with slower inventory turns) would 
expect to earn substantially more on its inventory investment (i.e., achieve a higher gross 
margin) than a retailer that has to carry the item of inventory for a shorter period. High variety 
fashionable products like jewelry and fashion apparel belong to the first category, while grocery 
and computer retailing belong to the second. The CEO of CompUSA Inc., a computer retail 
chain with gross margin of 5 to 15%, once remarked: “We have high inventory turns because we 
have to.” Thus, we expect to see an inverse relationship between gross margin and inventory 
turns as shown in figure 3. In economic terms, we would expect retailers within the same 
segment to achieve similar return on inventory, which is measured using GMRoII. Since 
 12
GMRoII is a product of gross margin and inventory turns, we would expect these two variables 
to be inversely related. 
GMi ´ ITi = Ks, 
where Ks is a constant specific to each segment. Equivalently, using logarithms,   
 log (ITi) = Ks + b log (GMi) + e i (9) 
It is important to note that since the model is cross-sectional and not time-series, the 
inverse relationship does not imply that if a firm increases its gross margin through better 
management, its inventory turns will decline commensurately. Instead, we propose that the 
correlation between gross margin and inventory turns exists due to their mutual dependence on 
the characteristics of a retailer’s business. 
Our main hypothesis of interest is as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS  4: Firms with high gross margin have low inventory turns and vice versa, 
i.e., b<0 in equation (9). 
 
Gross Margin and SG&A Expenses 
Another implication of the assumption of competitive markets is that retailers with high gross 
margins would expect to spend more on advertising and promotion, and thus, have high SG&A 
expenses. In order to test this hypothesis, we correlate average gross margin with average SGA 
as a proportion of sales using a cross-sectional model. 
 GMi = as + b (SGA/Sales)i (10) 
As before, the subscript s denotes the industry segment. The hypothesis will hold true if b>0. We 
estimate the model over periods of different lengths with the expectation that the relationship 
over longer periods will be stronger than that over shorter periods. 
HYPOTHESIS  5: Firms with higher gross margin as a fraction of sales have higher SG&A 
expenses as a fraction of sales and vice versa. 
Note that if the competitive market assumption holds true then it also implies a much 
stronger statement that, in expectation, both types of strategies, high gross margin and high SGA 
versus low gross margin and low SGA, should be equally profitable. This is formulated as the 
next hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS  6: The slope b  in equation (10) has a value of 1. In other words, a one point 
increase in gross margin (as a percent of sales) is associated with a one point increase in SG&A 
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expenses (as a percent of sales), so that firms with different gross margins achieve similar return 
on sales on average. 
 
Return on Assets and Sales Growth 
It is widely expected that retailers with higher sales growth should have lower return on assets 
compared to its competitors for the following reasons: 
1. In order to achieve rapid sales growth in a particular period, the retailer would open new 
stores during or before that period more aggressively than its competitors, and new stores 
being less profitable than old stores, this would reduce its return on assets. 
2. The retailer might reduce its prices and increase spending on advertising and promotion 
to achieve high sales growth. Both these actions result in lower return on assets. 
Amazon.com is a classic example of firms sacrificing return on assets for sales growth. 
Best Buy is another example because, as we observe from figure 2, it has the lowest return on 
assets and the highest sales growth rates of the firms considered. We test this relationship by 
using a cross-sectional model to regress average sales growth on average return on assets over 
time periods of length 1, 5, 10, 15, and 19 years, similar to the method used for gross margin and 
SGA above. For annual data, low return on assets in one year may be expected to correlate with 
high sales growth in the next year. Thus, we estimate the one year model both with and without 
time lag between return on assets and sales growth. However, for longer periods, time lag is 
disregarded. The hypothesis to be tested is as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS  7: Firms with low return on assets have high sales growth and vice versa. 
Note that the results of this hypothesis may also have a bearing on the regression of stock returns 
on return on assets and sales growth in section 3.1 since it would indicate collinearity between 
the independent variables in that regression. 
 
3.3 The relationship between bankruptcy and sales growth 
As noted earlier, retail firms show a very high incidence of bankruptcy. Firms that have filed 
under chapter 11 include not only small retailers but also large chains like Ames Department 
Stores, Caldor, Federated, Jamesway, Today’s Man, Filenes’ Basement, etc. Firms that have had 
a close brush with bankruptcy include the likes of K-Mart and Best Buy. Why is bankruptcy so 
rampant in retailing? Understandably, as researchers in accounting have noted, bankruptcy 
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reflects a liquidity crunch at a company. The objective of our research is to understand why so 
many retailers become illiquid by relating the likelihood of bankruptcy to sales growth. 
We theorize that bankruptcy risk relates to the difference between the growth targeted 
and the growth achieved by a retailer. Retailers targeting high growth rates have to increase 
assets such as stores, warehouse space, and inventory in anticipation of sales growth. Often the 
asset growth has to precede the anticipated sales growth substantially. Retailers that attempt to 
grow faster than their potential accumulate unproductive assets. When a retailer targeting a 
certain growth rate fails to achieve it, its risk of bankruptcy increases. 
The sales growth-asset growth mismatch scenario described above has been seen in many 
retail segments. Most recently, the footwear-retailing segment has fallen prey to this problem. 
Years of solid growth in both women’s footwear and athletic footwear induced the industry to 
project that the sales growth would continue. When the sales growth did not materialize, retailers 
like Nine West Group Inc. got stuck with unproductive assets, and encountered poor 
performance. Examples of retail firms that filed for bankruptcy because of growing too fast 
(adding too many stores too quickly) include Merry Go Round Enterprises and All For A Dollar 
Inc. Best Buy went into near bankruptcy in 1995 because of very high growth rate in early 
1990s. However, we did not find sufficient evidence to relate bankruptcy to financial leverage. 
Contrary to our expectations, we found that financial leverage of bankrupt firms was not 
significantly higher than that of healthy firms in the years preceding bankruptcy. We found 
several retail firms that went bankrupt in spite of low long-term borrowings. The results from 
this analysis will not be reported here for brevity. 
There are two alternative scenarios that can be developed to test our theory. 
1. Retailers that went bankrupt targeted higher growth rates than healthy firms.  
2. Retailers that went bankrupt had a greater mismatch between targeted and realized 
growth rates than healthy firms. 
The first scenario is more restrictive than the second. It argues that retailers that filed for 
bankruptcy attempted to grow more aggressively than their healthier counterparts, and thus, 
faced a higher risk of bankruptcy. The validity of this scenario can be tested by comparing the 
fixed assets growth rates of healthy retailers with those of bankrupt retailers in the years 
preceding the event of bankruptcy. If this scenario exists then we can develop a predictive model 
 15
of bankruptcy which estimates the probability of a retailer going bankrupt as a function of its 
fixed assets growth rate. 
The second scenario implies that bankrupt retailers did not necessarily attempt to grow 
more aggressively than healthy retailers but they could not achieve their targeted growth rates 
either because of execution problems or because they attempted to grow faster than their 
potential. Thus, the bankrupt retailers show a greater mismatch between targeted and realized 
growth rates than healthy retailers. This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the time rate of 
change of fixed assets productivity (i.e., fixed asset turns) of healthy and bankrupt retailers in the 
years preceding bankruptcy. If the hypothesis holds then the fixed asset turns of bankrupt 
retailers should decline more rapidly than that for healthy retailers. In this case, a predictive 
model can be developed to estimate the probability of a retailer going bankrupt as a function of 
the changes in its fixed assets productivity. 
We test the following hypotheses to find which of the above two scenarios holds. 
Hypotheses 8 and 9 establish the grounds for relating bankruptcy to sales growth. Hypothesis 8 
states that sales growth rate of a retail firm declines over time because as it fills its market space, 
there are fewer and fewer avenues available for growth. Hypothesis 9 ascertains whether retailers 
that filed for bankruptcy had lower realized growth rates than healthy retailers in the years 
preceding the incidence of bankruptcy. Hypothesis 10 tests whether bankrupt retailers attempted 
to grow more aggressively than healthy retailers in order to determine the validity of scenario 1. 
Lastly, hypothesis 11 determines the validity of scenario 2. 
HYPOTHESIS  8: Sales growth and asset productivity show decreasing trends over the life 
of a retail firm. 
HYPOTHESIS  9: Retailers that filed for bankruptcy have lower sales growth rates during 
the years preceding bankruptcy than healthy retailers. 
HYPOTHESIS  10: Retailers that filed for bankruptcy have higher fixed assets growth rates 
during the years preceding bankruptcy than healthy retailers. 
HYPOTHESIS  11: Fixed asset turns decrease over time more rapidly for bankrupt firms 
than for healthy firms. 
We test hypotheses 9 and 10 by comparing annual fixed assets and sales growth rates of 
retailers that filed for bankruptcy with the average rates for healthy retail firms (in the years 
preceding bankruptcy). For testing hypotheses 8 and 11, we conduct time-series regressions of 
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sales growth and fixed asset turns with respect to time. The regression equation for sales growth 
rate is 
 git = ai + b  t + e it (11) 
and hypothesis 8 implies that b  < 0. The regression equation for fixed asset turns is more 
complex because fixed asset turns vary significantly across retail segments. We standardize time 
series values of fixed asset turns to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 by firm to ensure 
comparability across firms and estimate the following quadratic model separately for healthy and 
bankrupt firms. The time-series for bankrupt firms are aligned such that the year of bankruptcy 
corresponds to the same value of t and all data available before the year of bankruptcy are used. 
A quadratic term in t is added because firms, before filing for bankruptcy, close many stores to 
try to tide over the oncoming liquidity crisis. This increases their asset turns in the one-two years 
before bankruptcy. Here FTit denotes standardized fixed asset turns for firm i in period t. 
 Healthy Firms: FTit = ah + b1h t + b2h t2 + e ith 
 Bankrupt Firms: FTit = ab + b1b t + b2b t2 + e itb (12) 
Hypothesis 8 implies that b1h < 0 and b1b < 0, and hypothesis 11 implies that b1b < b1h. 
 
4. Data 
Accounting data for this study were obtained from S&P’s Compustat database and the monthly 
stock price, stock return and market index data were obtained from CRSP. We obtained data for 
all public listed “brick & mortar” retail companies over the 20 year period 1978-97 which 
comprised the following industry segments: Apparel and Accessories, Convenience stores, 
Department stores, Drug and pharmaceuticals, Grocery, Hobby toys and games stores, Home 
furnishings, Jewelry, Consumer electronics and computers, and Variety stores. The database 
contains a total of 346 companies. For each company, we computed performance variables as 
defined in appendices 1 and 2. 
From this set, we chose companies for testing hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 for different time 
periods of length 5, 10, 15 and 19 years. The firms selected in each case satisfy two conditions: 
(i) they should have time series data for the entire time period under consideration; (ii) they 
should not have gone bankrupt, been bought by another company or been de-listed from the 
stock exchange for other reasons during this period. The final sample size used for each time 
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period is shown along with the results. The total number of distinct firms numbered 150 across 
12 industry segments. Surprisingly, in each case the number of firms is less than one-fourth of 
the total sample size of 346 firms, with the 19 year period having only 32 firms. This is in 
consonance with our earlier observation that not many retail firms survive for a long period of 
time. 
For the second set of hypotheses, 4 through 7, pertaining to interrelationships between 
performance levers, we used average values for the variables concerned for all healthy firms that 
had data available for the relevant time periods. The time periods over which averages were 
computed are indicated in the respective tables containing the results. 
For the third set of hypotheses, 8 through 11, we constructed two samples of firms; one a 
sample of all firms that had gone bankrupt and had at least 5 years of data available before the 
year of bankruptcy; and the second, a sample of all firms that did not go bankrupt during the 20 
year period 1978-97 and had at least five years of data available. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Association between stock returns and accounting based performance variables 
The results for the regression of stock returns on return on equity and sales growth, and on return 
on assets, sales growth, standard deviation of return on assets and financial leverage are shown in 
table 2. Before interpreting these results, we note that in the cases where time-periods overlap, 
the results are not independent of each other. The reasons for using different time windows are to 
control for the effect of beginning and ending years on stock returns, and to test how results vary 
with the length of the period. We also note that there is some collinearity between return on 
assets and sales growth, and likewise between return on equity and sales growth for longer time 
periods. Firms with greater profitability in the long run tend to be the firms with higher sales 
growth as well. This finding is discussed in detail below along with the results for hypothesis 7. 
In most cases, the collinearity was not large enough to affect the parameter estimates. Doing 
principal components analysis on the independent variables also gave us components that were 
almost the same as the original variables. However, in three cases, we eliminated sales growth 
from the model because of high collinearity. 
We make the following observations from these two tables: 
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1. Hypothesis 1 holds. The association between the independent variables and stock returns 
is significant in almost every case. Return on assets and sales growth have positive 
correlation and standard deviation of return on assets has negative correlation with stock 
returns. Financial leverage, where significant, has a positive correlation with stock 
returns, so that firms with high leverage have high stock returns. 
2. Return on assets, standard deviation of return on assets, sales growth and financial 
leverage explain between 35 to 72 per cent of the variation in stock returns. These 
number are as high as those obtained for return on equity and sales growth, showing the 
importance of managing the component levers of return on equity. 
3. Our results are consistent with prior studies done in financial accounting. Specifically, the 
values of R-square obtained are comparable to those obtained by Easton, Harris and 
Ohlson (1992) for the association between net earnings and stock returns. The value of R-
square is higher for longer time periods than for shorter time periods. The standard error 
of stock return is also found to be lower for longer time periods. 
One question often asked by retailers is which variable is stock return more sensitive 
to¾sales growth or profitability. In order to answer this question, we conducted standardized 
regression of stock returns on the independent variables, i.e., we standardized all variables to 
mean 0 and standard deviation 1 and then estimated the regression equations. Standardization 
controls for differences in the units used to express the independent variables, and differences in 
the level of variation in their values. Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates from these 
regressions. We see that the coefficient of return on equity is always larger than the coefficient of 
sales growth. Thus, the long-term stock returns are more sensitive to a unit standard deviation 
change in return on equity than to a unit standard deviation change in sales growth. The picture 
as regards return on assets versus sales growth is less clear. Stock return seems to be equally 
sensitive to a change in either of them. We think that the different levels of sensitivity to RoE 
and RoA are found because of financial leverage. For example, consider a firm with RoA of 10% 
and equity constituting 40% of its total book value. The RoE of this firm is 25%. Suppose it 
doubles its RoA to 20%, keeping leverage constant. The RoE of the firm also doubles to 50%. If 
all firms in the cross-sectional model had identical financial leverage (or if financial leverage had 
no impact on stock returns) then the standardized coefficients of RoA and RoE in the above 
regressions would be the same and it would be irrelevant whether we use RoA or RoE as 
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independent variables. However, as we have already seen, leverage has a positive association 
with stock returns. Thus, the stock market is slightly more sensitive to changes in RoE than to 
changes in RoA. 
The results of the regression of stock return on GMRoII, sales growth and financial 
leverage are shown in table 4. The coefficient of GMRoII is consistently positive, and in five out 
of eight cases, it is significant at more than 90% confidence level, confirming hypothesis 2. It is 
intuitively expected that the association between GMRoII and stock return should not be as 
strong as between return on assets and stock return because GMRoII is only one component of 
return on assets. Good performance by a retailer on GMRoII does not necessarily imply good 
operating profitability since the retailer may be incurring disproportionately high selling 
expenses or may have too small an investment in inventory (low inventory to assets ratio). 
The conclusions from estimating equations (4) and (5) are similar to those obtained from 
equation (1). Table 5 shows the results for one of the time periods examined, 1988-97. We find 
that the coefficients of gross margin and SG&A expenses are equal and opposite with more than 
99% confidence level. The stock market values their difference, operating earnings, while giving 
equal weights to gross margin and SG&A expenses. 
Lastly, we also estimated the impact of the above levers on risk-adjusted stock returns. 
We used a single data set here consisting of all firms with at least 10 years of data that did not 
file for bankruptcy at all during 1978-1997. The results obtained are consistent with those in 
tables 2 and 4. Return on equity, return on assets, and sales growth have statistically significant 
positive association with stock returns. Standard deviation of return on assets, financial leverage 
and GMRoII also have coefficients in the expected directions, but their estimates are not 
statistically significant. 
 
5.2 Interrelationships between performance variables 
Inventory Turns and Gross Margin 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between gross margin and inventory turns for consumer 
electronics retailers using quarterly time-series data for ten years, demonstrating the inverse 
logarithmic relationship we expect to see. Table 6 gives the results of the regression for all retail 
segments using two groups of firms: one with all firms with at least ten years of data during 
1978-97 and another with all firms with at least five years of data during this period. The first set 
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of firms is smaller and has more time-series information about each firm, but doing the 
regression for a larger set as well gives us an indication of the robustness of the results. Inventory 
turns have a very strong relationship with gross margin with R-square of about 64% and all 
parameters being significant at 99%. Retailers with high inventory turns have low gross margins, 
and vice versa. However, the coefficient of log GM is not -1 but about -0.5, indicating that 
GMRoII does not remain constant as GM and IT vary between retail firms. This is so because, as 
GM and IT change, SGA intensity and inventory intensity also change systematically so that 
retailers in a retail segment need not have similar gross margin return on inventory even though 
they expect to have similar return on assets. 
Gross Margin and SG&A Expenses 
We regressed average gross margins against average SG&A expenses (as a percent of sales) for 
time periods of lengths varying from ten years to one year in the period 1988 to 1997. Table 7 
shows the results for the ten-year period 1988-97 and for the year 1997. Retail segment-specific 
intercepts were not required as industry effect on the model was found to be negligible. The R-
square for the ten-year period is 82.2% and the regression model is highly significant, providing 
evidence for hypothesis 5. The R-square for the one-year period is also surprisingly high at 
74.3%. Figure 5 presents a plot of average gross margin versus average SG&A expenses for the 
ten-year period; it can be seen from the plot that the model fits extremely well and the residuals 
of the regression equation are quite low. In both the time-periods, the slope of SGA is not 
different from 1 with a confidence level of 95%. Thus, we also accept hypothesis 6. 
An estimate of 1 for the slope and the surprisingly small residuals indicate the existence 
of an equilibrium in the market wherein GM and SGA compensate each other very strongly. 
Retailers with superior performance distinguish themselves by locating above the regression line, 
and retailers with poor performance (for example, firms that filed for bankruptcy) lie below the 
regression line. This is consistent with the results of estimation of equations (4) and (5) given in 
table 5. The equal and opposite coefficients of gross margin and SG&A expenses imply that their 
difference, operating earnings, correlates well with stock returns. 
Return on Assets and Sales Growth 
We did not find any evidence to support hypothesis 7. Quite to the contrary, return on assets and 
sales growth have positive correlation with each other for almost all sub-periods during 1978 to 
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97. The extent of association is stronger for longer time periods than for shorter periods. When 
we estimated the interrelationship using one-year data with time lag, we found that return on 
assets in a year did not have any statistically significant association with sales growth in the next 
year. Quarterly data may be more appropriate for testing a time-lagged relationship between 
return on assets and sales growth. 
 
5.3 The relationship between bankruptcy and sales growth 
Table 8 shows the results of regressing time-series sales growth of each retailer on number of 
years as independent variable to find if there is a declining trend in sales growth, as specified in 
the generalized linear model equation (11). When the slope parameter is modeled to be identical 
across retailers, we find that the R-square is 32.2% and the estimate of slope is highly significant 
with an estimate of –0.997. The negative value of this estimate confirms the first part of 
hypothesis 8 that sales growth rates of retailers decline over time. We also estimated the model 
using different slope parameters for different firms. In this case, the R-square is understandably 
higher at 50.5% and both the firm effect and the time effect are again highly significant. The 
median value of the slope b i across retailers is –0.941 (which is close to the estimate obtained 
using a single slope parameter) and 147 out of the 185 companies in the sample have negative 
slopes. Thus, for an average retailer, sales growth rate declines at a rate of about 1 percentage 
point per year. 
Table 9 shows the estimated sales and fixed assets growth rates of healthy firms and 
bankrupt firms in the years preceding bankruptcy. The average annual sales growth rate of a 
healthy retail firm is 13.92%. The average sales growth rate of a firm that filed for bankruptcy 
decreases from 7.38% four years before bankruptcy to 3.22% three years before bankruptcy, 
0.67% one year before bankruptcy and –12.43% during the year of bankruptcy. In every year, the 
sales growth rate of bankrupt firms is lower than that of healthy firms and in three cases, it is 
statistically significant at 99% and hypothesis 9 is accepted. 
The fixed assets growth rate of bankrupt firms is not higher than that of healthy firms in 
any year. Thus, hypothesis 10 is rejected and scenario 1 does not appear to hold generally for all 
bankrupt firms. In other words, firms that file for bankruptcy do not necessarily attempt to grow 
faster than healthy firms in the years preceding the occurrence of bankruptcy. 
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The results of estimating equations (12) are as follows. The figures in parentheses are 
standard errors of parameter estimates and all values are significant at 95% or higher confidence 
levels. 
Healthy Firms: FTit = 0.60  – 0.031 t  – 0.002 t2  + e it 
 (0.062) (0.013) (0.0006) R2 = 16.12% 
 
Bankrupt Firms: FTit = 11.89  – 1.298 t  + 0.034 t2  + e it 
 (3.885) (0.477) (0.014) R2 = 18.57% 
 
Since the coefficients of t in both equations are negative, it confirms that fixed asset productivity 
declines over time for all retailers (hypothesis 8). Also, the estimate –1.298 is less than –0.031 at 
99% confidence level, confirming that bankrupt firms exhibit a much faster decline in fixed asset 
productivity in the years preceding bankruptcy than healthy firms. This indicates that “scenario 
2” provides a plausible explanation of the occurrence of bankruptcy in retail firms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have used financial statement and stock market data for public listed retail firms to study 
various managerial levers and assess their relationship with firm success measured by long-term 
stock returns and the incidence of bankruptcy. Some of our results confirm our intuition: (1) 
retailers with superior long-term stock returns have high return on assets, high sales growth, and 
high gross margin return on inventory; (2) grocery firms have higher inventory turns and lower 
gross margin than jewelry firms, and other retail segments lie between the two as expected; and 
(3) retailers that went bankrupt showed more rapid decline in asset productivity than healthy 
retailers. 
 However, we have also uncovered some surprises and some new findings: (1) return on 
assets is not negatively correlated with sales growth; (2) retailers in different segments have 
similar return on assets and return on equity, although their component measures have very 
different values; (3) there are strong associations between gross margin and inventory turns, and 
between gross margin and selling, general and administrative expenses, showing that firms 
achieve success in many different ways; (4) stock returns have a negative correlation with 
standard deviation of return on assets; (5) retailers that went bankrupt were not targeting higher 
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growth rates than healthy retailers; and (6) bankruptcy in retailing is unrelated to financial 
leverage. 
Our research achieves several objectives. It measures the impact of managerial levers like 
sales growth and profitability on the overall long-term firm success. It documents the widely 
different strategies that retailers use to achieve similar results on profitability. It provides rules 
that can be used to compare the performance of one company with another by recognizing the 
tradeoffs between performance variables. Lastly, it provides a methodology that can be used to 
study the impact of managerial levers on success in other industries. 
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Appendix 1: Notation 
 
i firm index 
s retail segment index (e.g., apparel, grocery, consumer electronics, etc.) 
t time index, representing either years or quarters, as the case may be 
 
Income Statement and Balance Sheet Items: 
S Sales (Net of markdowns) 
CGS Cost of Goods Sold (includes occupancy and distribution costs) 
SGA Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 
EBITDA Operating Profit (Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
expenses) 
FA Fixed Assets 
Inv Inventory 
TA Total Assets 
OE Owners’ Equity 
 
Performance Measures (defined in appendix 2) 
GM Gross Margin (%) 
OM Operating Margin (%) 
AT Total Asset Turns 
IT Inventory Turns 
FT Fixed Asset Turns 
GMRoII Gross Margin Return on Inventory Investment (%) 
RoA Return on Assets (%) 
RoE Return on Equity (%) 
g Sales Growth Rate (%) 
h Fixed Assets Growth Rate (%) 
DE Financial Leverage (Ratio of long-term debt to equity) 
s-RoA Standard deviation of RoA over some time period 
DGMRoII GMRoII standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 by industry segment  
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Appendix 2 
Definition of Accounting Statements based Performance Measures 
 
Return on Equity    ( ) 2/1 tt
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Figure 1a 
Histogram of Average Annual Stock Returns of Retail Firms during 1978-97 
(Data: 293 out of 346 firms that had at least 2 years of stock return history) 
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Figure 1b 
Histogram of Average Annual Returns of Firms in the S&P 500 index on 
Dec 31, 1978 during the period 1978-97 
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Figure 2: Time Series of Performance Measures for Four Consumer Electronics Retailers 
from Dec 1985 to Dec 19954 
 
 
                                                                 
4 Numbers in the legends give average values of sales growth rate, return on assets, inventory turns, gross margin 
and annual stock returns respectively over this period. 
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(c) Average Annual Inventory Turns
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(e) Value of $1 investment over time 
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Figure 4: Quarterly Gross Margins and Inventory Turns  
for all Consumer Electronics Retailers for 1986-95 
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Figure 5: Average Gross Margin Vs Average SGA Expenses 
for all Retail Firms for 1988-97 
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Table 1: Estimation of effect of retail segment on various model variables using ANOVA 
yis = a s + e is 
 
where yis is the average value of a performance variable (IT, GM, RoA, etc.) for firm i in retail 
segment s over some period of time. The independent variables are indicator variables for 
various segments. For this analysis, we used all retail firms with at least 5 consecutive years of 
data available in 1978-97. 
 
Number of Industry Segments for each model variable: 10 
Number of firms:      144 
 
 
yis AT GM GMRoII IT RoA g RoE DE
1 
R-square 0.475 0.433 0.325 0.530 0.073 0.073 0.018 0.155 
F-statistic for as 13.45a 11.37a 7.18a 16.77a 1.17 1.18 0.28 2.74b 
Average Values for Retail Segments for Variables with significant F-statistics    
Apparel and 
accessory stores 
2.22 36.13 239.7 6.64     
Convenience stores 3.55 21.38 474.3 21.34     
Department stores 1.79 32.15 245.1 7.75     
Drug & proprietary 
stores 
2.99 25.48 171.1 7.00     
Grocery stores 4.06 24.48 392.9 16.28     
Hobby, toy and 
game shops 
1.68 31.44 132.8 4.29     
Home furniture & 
equip store 
1.68 43.41 173.6 4.01     
Jewelry stores 1.42 52.44 138.1 2.64     
Radio, TV, Cons. 
Electronics stores 
2.73 33.12 167.1 5.38     
Variety stores 2.65 27.43 152.4 6.13     
 
a significant at 0.0001 
b significant at 0.01 
 
1 For DE (financial leverage), although the F-statistic is significant at 0.01, we did not find significant differences at 
95% confidence level between any pair of retail segments using any of the following tests, Bonferroni, Tukey, and 
Scheffe. 
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Table 2: Results of the Regression of Stock Returns on RoE and Sales Growth, 
and on RoA, Sales Growth, Standard Deviation of RoA, and Financial Leverage 
 
Stock Return Vs RoE and Sales Growth1  Stock Return Vs RoA, Sales Growth, s-RoA, and DE ratio1 Time Period Number 
of Firms 
R2 Intercept RoE Sales 
Growth 
 R2 Intercept RoA Sales 
Growth 
s-RoA DE ratio 
19 yrs 1979-97 32 
 
 
0.602 
 
6.28 
(2.24)a 
0.67 
(0.18)a 
0.36 
(0.18)b 
 0.666 
 
10.58 
(6.37) 
0.64 
(0.27)b 
0.51 
(0.16)a 
-1.52 
0.45)a 
-3.19 
(3.36) 
15 yrs 1983-97 35 
 
 
0.629 
 
7.90 
(1.82)a 
0.57 
(0.13)a 
0.40 
(0.16)a 
 0.717 
 
-2.17 
(5.35) 
1.02 
(0.22)a 
0.48 
(0.14)a 
-0.75 
(0.37)b 
3.54 
(2.65) 
1979-88 42 
 
 
0.374 
 
12.04 
(3.45)a 
1.06 
(0.22)a 
-2  0.384 
 
10.12 
(7.52) 
1.13 
(0.33)a 
-2 -1.82 
(0.69)a 
5.99 
(2.85)b 
10 yrs 
1988-97 59 
 
 
0.478 
 
-2.38 
(1.60) 
0.57 
(0.11)a 
0.32 
(0.12)b 
 0.528 
 
-14.51 
(4.29)a 
0.99 
(0.17)a 
0.34 
(0.12)a 
-0.006 
(0.44) 
4.54 
(2.28)b 
1979-83 81 
 
 
0.423 
 
10.28 
(2.59)a 
1.39 
(0.18)a 
-2  0.352 
 
7.23 
(5.19) 
0.83 
(0.28)a 
0.57 
(0.19)a 
-0.62 
(0.57) 
3.02 
(2.16) 
1983-87 49 
 
 
0.450 
 
18.23 
(5.35)a 
1.15 
(0.41)a 
0.77 
(0.30)b 
 0.532 
 
-12.75 
(11.10) 
1.45 
(0.53)a 
1.19 
(0.28)a 
1.33 
(1.09) 
19.64 
(5.74)a 
1988-92 69 
 
 
0.503 
 
-9.49 
(2.62)a 
0.78 
(0.16)a 
0.74 
(0.15)a 
 0.471 
 
-13.99 
(5.63)a 
0.98 
(0.25)a 
0.72 
(0.17)a 
-0.44 
(0.71) 
-0.85 
(3.46) 
5 yrs 
1993-97 93 
 
0.250 
 
-1.81 
(2.21) 
0.65 
(0.15)a 
0.25 
(0.11)b 
 0.348 
 
-16.91 
(5.81)a 
1.41 
(0.29)a 
0.29 
(0.11)a 
-0.80 
(0.59) 
4.79 
(2.51)b 
 
a significant at 0.01 
b significant at 0.05 
 
1 F-tests for all models are significant at 0.01. Figures in brackets below parameter estimates give their standard errors 
2 Sales Growth was not used as an independent variable in these cases because of collinearity with RoE or RoA. 
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Table 3: Standardized Coefficients for the Regression of Stock Return on RoE and Sales 
Growth, and on RoA, Sales Growth, Standard Deviation of RoA and Financial Leverage1 
 
 
Stock Return Vs RoE and 
Sales Growth 
Stock Return Vs RoA, Sales Growth, 
s-RoA and DE ratio 
Time Period 
RoE Sales Growth  RoA Sales Growth s-RoA DE ratio 
19 yrs 1979-97 0.558 0.298  0.365 0.420 -0.433 -0.142 
15 yrs 1983-97 0.561 0.325  0.613 0.391 -0.217 0.173 
1979-88 0.611 -  0.444 - -0.339 0.276 10 yrs 
1988-97 0.542 0.279  0.611 0.296 -0.004 0.209 
1979-83 0.650 -  0.326 0.323 -0.102 0.133 
1983-87 0.390 0.354  0.360 0.547 0.134 0.404 
1988-92 0.445 0.442  0.392 0.431 -0.064 0.027 
5 yrs 
1993-97 0.402 0.202  0.441 0.235 -0.130 0.168 
 
1 R2 values and statistical significance of all coefficients are identical to those for corresponding non-standardized 
models in tables 3 and 4. 
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Table 4: Results of the Regression of Stock Return on DGMRoII, 
Sales Growth and DE ratio 
 
 
Parameter Estimates2 Time Period Number 
of Firms 
R-square1 
Intercept DGMRoII Sales 
Growth 
DE ratio 
19 yrs 1979-97 32 0.452 
 
9.38 
(3.82)b 
0.86 
(0.61) 
0.86 
(0.20)a 
-1.85 
(3.28) 
15 yrs 1983-97 35 0.530 
 
6.81 
(3.39)b 
1.28 
(0.47)a 
0.97 
(0.18)a 
0.78 
(2.78) 
1979-88 42 0.414 
 
12.76 
(3.34)a 
1.22 
(0.80) 
0.84 
(0.18)a 
2.58 
(3.35) 
10 yrs 
1988-97 59 0.286 
 
-0.25 
(2.34) 
0.64 
(0.34)c 
0.59 
(0.14)a 
0.78 
(2.46) 
1979-83 80 0.297 
 
14.55 
(2.87)a 
0.59 
(0.60) 
0.97 
(0.17)a 
1.51 
(2.29) 
1983-87 48 0.517 
 
17.01 
(5.82)a 
2.58 
(0.79)a 
1.57 
(0.24)a 
7.72 
(5.59) 
1988-92 68 0.378 
 
-2.98 
(3.36) 
1.19 
(0.59)b 
0.97 
(0.17)a 
-2.43 
(3.62) 
5 yrs 
1993-97 92 0.153 
 
-1.19 
(2.80) 
0.99 
(0.46)b 
0.38 
(0.12)a 
3.86 
(2.77) 
 
a significant at 0.01 
b significant at 0.05 
c significant at 0.10 
 
1 F-tests for all models are significant at 0.01 
2 Figures in brackets below parameter estimates give their standard errors 
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Table 5: Results of the Regression of Stock Returns on Gross Margin, SG&A Expenses, 
Inventory, and Total Assets for 1988-97 
 
 
 Results of equation (4)1 Results of equation (5)1 
R2 0.387 0.530 
Number of observations 59 59 
Intercept -4.1 (4.7) -1.38 (4.04) 
Gross Margin per dollar 
investment in stock 
15300 (2811)a 20959 (2788)a 
SG&A Expenses per dollar 
investment in stock 
-16036 (2929)a -21165 (2834)a 
Inventory2 
 Grocery firms 
 Non-grocery firms 
 
-2203 (1041)b 
-1360 (662)b 
 
Total Assets2 
 Grocery firms 
 Non-grocery firms 
  
-493 (211)b 
-1726 (373)a 
 
a significant at 0.01 
b significant at 0.05 
 
1 F-tests for both models are significant at 0.01. The figures in brackets give standard errors of estimates. 
2 Because of the small number of data points, we did not estimate separate coefficients for a ll industry segments. We 
included convenience stores and grocery stores in the first group, and all remaining firms in the second group, since 
these had the widest separation between their inventory turns and asset turns values. 
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Table 6: Test for the Interrelationship between Inventory Turns and Gross Margin 
 
Model equation: log ITi = as + b  log GMi + e i 
 
where log ITi is the log of average inventory turns for firm i, log GMi is the log of average gross 
margin for firm i, and as is an industry specific intercept. 
 
 Results for all firms with at least 5 
years of data 
Results for all firms with at least 
10 years of data 
Number of firms 157 80 
Number of retail segments 14 11 
R-square 0.638 0.640 
F-test for significance of industry 
specific intercept 
10.51a 7.01a 
Estimated coefficient of log GM 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
-0.530 
(0.126)a 
-0.474 
(0.207)a 
 
a significant at 0.0001 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Test for the Interrelationship between Gross Margin and SG&A Expenses 
 
Model equation: GMi = a + b  SGAi + e i 
 
where GMi and SGAi are expressed as percent of sales. They denote average values of gross 
margin and SGA for firm i over time. Segment specific intercept was not required because 
industry effect was negligible. 
 
 Results for all healthy firms with 
10 years of data (1988 to 1997) 
Results for all healthy firms for 
1997 
Number of firms 82 158 
R-square 0.822 0.743 
Intercept (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
8.10 (1.28)a 9.02 (1.20)a 
Estimated coefficient of SGA 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
0.96 (0.050)a 0.94 (0.044)a 
 
a significant at 0.01 
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Table 8: Results for the estimation of declining trend in sales growth rate over time 
gi t = a i + b  t + e i t 
 
Number of firms 185 
Number of data points 2305 
R-square 0.322 
F-value for the model 5.44 (significant at 0.0001) 
Estimated coefficient of time, b -0.997 (standard error = 0.0996) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Estimation of sales growth rates and fixed assets growth rates of healthy firms and 
firms that filed for bankruptcy (in the years preceding bankruptcy) 
 
 
 Number of 
firms 
Average and Standard Error 
of Sales Growth Rate (%) 
Average and Standard Error of 
Fixed Assets Growth Rate (%) 
Annual average for 
healthy firms 
174 13.92 
(2.31) 
17.29 
(0.70) 
4 years before 
bankruptcy 
27 7.38 
(2.09) 
9.39 
(3.68) 
3 years 29 3.22 
(1.96)b 
10.94 
(5.05) 
2 years 29 7.72 
(4.44) 
14.32 
(7.20) 
1 year 30 0.67 
(5.61)b 
2.67 
(4.41) 
During the year of 
bankruptcy 
33 -12.43 
(2.85)a 
-15.39 
(3.58) 
 
a Sales growth rate of a bankrupt firm is less than the sales growth rate of a healthy firm with p £ 0.01 
b Sales growth rate of a bankrupt firm is less than the sales growth rate of a healthy firm with p £ 0.05 
 
